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RECENT CASES

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-Peremptory Challenges by
Defense- Racially Discriminatory Use of
Peremptory Challenges by Defense
Counsel Violates Both the Civil Rights
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the New York State Constitution:
People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554
N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990).*
In People v. Kern,' the New York Court of Appeals firmly rejected the defense counsel's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
potential jurors on the basis of race in criminal trials.' Accordingly,
the Court imposed upon New York defendants the restrictions set
forth in Batson v. Kentucky8 whenever the prosecution is able to establish that the defense counsel used peremptory challenges to exclude a particular racial group."
* To reward outstanding legal writing, the staff of the Dickinson Law Review has elected
to publish annually one casenote submitted in the Dickinson Law Review Summer Casenote
Writing Competition. Beth L. Winters, 1990-91 Notes Editor, conducted the research
associated with this note.
1. 75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990).
2. Judge Alexander delivered the unanimous opinion of the court in which Chief Judge
Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacose concurred.
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. Kern, 76 N.Y.2d at 657-58, 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658. Although the
New York Court of Appeals became the first state high court to prohibit defense counsel's use
of racially biased peremptory challenges in conjunction with the Batson rule, the court properly noted the prior decisions of three other state courts that are in accord with Kern. See
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In Batson, the United States Supreme Court prohibited the

prosecution from exercising its peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner, but specifically left unanswered "whether
the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory
challenges by defense counsel." Under national publicity, 6 the

Court of Appeals affirmatively answered that question for the State
of New York7 by applying the civil rights clause of the New York
Constitution. The decision "ignit[ed] howls of protest from some in
the legal community" 8 while drawing nods of approval from others.9
The Howard Beach incident' occurred in the early morning of
December 20, 1986, when a group of twelve white teenagers wielding baseball bats and tree limbs attacked three black men." One of
the victims was struck and killed by an automobile while attempting

to escape his assailants by running across a six-lane highway. 2
Three of the youths were subsequently arrested and indicted for the
attack. 3
On the first day of jury selection, the prosecution argued that
the defense was attempting to empanel an all-white jury by exercising its peremptory challenges to exclude prospective black jurors.' 4
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) (prosecution's
peremptory challenges violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury chosen from a crosssection of the community); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (Florida Constitution
guarantees the right to an impartial jury); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Ma.. 461, 387
N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) (prosecution's peremptory challenges violated
defendant's right to an impartial jury).
5. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12.
6. Known as the "Howard Beach Case," the racially motivated attack on three black
men took .place in 1986 in the predominantly white Howard Beach section of Queens, New
York. See Anderson, N.Y. Extends Batson to Defense, A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 24 (referring to
Kern as "the case that gained national attention"); Note, Moving Closer to Eliminating Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Challenge to the Peremptory, 7 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS.
204 nn. 1-4 (1989) (citing several New York Times articles that reported the incident).
7. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 643, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1236, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648
(1990).
8. Anderson, supra note 6, at 24. For a discussion of the need to retain the peremptory
challenge, see generally Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge - An Obituary, 1989 CR|M. L.
REV.

528.

9. See generally Note, supra note 6, at 236-38 (suggesting that defendants' peremptory
challenge use should be limited by Batson as is prosecutors' use); Note, Discrimination by the
Defense: Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 359-61 (1988)
(arguing for the extension of Batson to the defense).
10. See supra note 6.
11. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 643-46, 554 N.E.2d at 1236-39, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 548-51.
12. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 645, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1238, 555 N.Y.S. 2d 647,
650 (1990).
13. Id. at 646, 554 N.E.2d at 1238, 555 N.Y.S. 2d at 650. The defendants were Scott
Kern, Jon Lester, and Jason Ladone.
14. Id. at 647, 554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
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This initial protest by the prosecution was rejected as premature. 15
After the prosecution's continued protests, however, the trial court
ruled on the fourth day of jury selection that the procedures articu-

lated in Batson v. Kentucky were applicable to defense counsel if
peremptory challenges were exercised in a racially discriminatory
manner." As a result of these restrictions, the defendants were unable to categorically exempt black jurors, whom defense counsel
claimed were much more prone to convict the white defendants.
The trial court entered convictions against all three defendants for
second degree manslaughter and first degree assault, which the supreme court, appellate division "affirmed

. .

.in all respects." 18 The

Court of Appeals emphatically agreed with the lower court's decision, stating that "['U]ustice would indeed be blind if it failed to
recognize that the [trial] court is employed as a vehicle for racial
discrimination when peremptory challenges are used to exclude jurors on the basis of their race ... '"is
Kern instructs that purposeful racial discrimination in the selec-

tion of jurors is prohibited by both the civil rights and equal protection clauses of the New York State Constitution.20 Hence, the prosecution may employ the Batson procedure for making an equal
protection claim on behalf of the wrongfully excused jurors by dem-

onstrating: (1) that the excused juror is a member of a cognizable
racial group; (2) that the defense has exercised peremptory challenges to exclude members of that group from the petit jury; and (3)
that "'these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference' of purposeful discrimination."21
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647,
651 (1990). Defense counsel's belief that black jurors would inevitably be biased against the
white defendants was evidenced by their statement that "the black jurors did not want to be
excused," but instead were "volunteering" for jury duty. Id.
18. People v. Kern, 149 A.D.2d 187, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 1989), affd 75 N.Y.2d
638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990).
19. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd on hearing, 895
F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990)).
20. Id. at 650, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § II
provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of
the state.
The first sentence of this section is the equal protection clause. The second sentence is the civil
rights clause. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 650-51, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
21. Id. at 649, 554 N.E.2d at 1240, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky,
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Upon demonstration of a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defense must in turn provide a racially neutral explanation for hav-

ing challenged the jurors, or the court will reinstate those jurors on
the venire. 2 1 Only by extending the restrictions of Batson to the defense, the Court of Appeals concluded, could the civil right to par-

ticipate in the administration of justice and the integrity of the criminal trial process be preserved.2 3
Although not constitutionally mandated, peremptory challenges

are of ancient origin in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.2 ' Indeed, they
have long been regarded as "one of the most important rights se-

cured to the accused" in ensuring a fair and impartial jury.25 Moreover, unlike challenges for cause, the essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it can be exercised for any reason, without
inquiry or control from the court.2 6 Nevertheless, as early as 1879,

the Supreme Court recognized that categorically excluding blacks
from jury service violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution."
The competing values of the constitutional right to equal protection and the statutory right to peremptory challenges first collided in
Swain v. Alabama.2 8 Although Swain recognized the equal protection infringement upon a defendant in the state's use of peremptory

challenges to exclude members of the defendant's race, it denied re476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986)). The petit jury is "[t]he ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or
criminal action, so called to distinguish it from the grand jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
768 (5th ed. 1979).
22. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 647, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1240, 555 N.Y.2d 647, 652
(1990).
23. Id. at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
24. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-21 (1965). Ironically, the English who created
the peremptory challenge, have recently abolished it. See generally Gobert, supra note 8, at
528-36; Comment, The Continued Use of Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky: Is the Only Alternative to Eliminate the Peremptory Challenge Itself., 23
NEw ENG. L. REV. 221, 223-27 (1988).
25. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408
(1894)). By securing juries "which in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair and impartial," the peremptory challenge assures confidence in our judicial system. Id. at 212.
26. Id. at 220.
27. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (state statute prohibiting blacks
from participating in jury service held unconstitutional). As Justice Strong poignantly
explained:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of
their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified,
is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing
to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others.
Id. at 308.
28. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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lief absent evidence that the prosecution was systematically excluding a particular race in cases other than the defendant's.2 9 Swain
endured for over twenty years until the Supreme Court decision in
Batson v. Kentucky. 30 In Batson, Swain's high evidentiary standard
was explicitly overturned and the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle espoused in Strauder v. West Virginia.1
Batson involved a black defendant indicted for second degree
burglary. 2 On the first day of Batson's trial, the prosecution used its
peremptory challenges to remove four black people from the venire,
which resulted in a jury composed only of white people."a Defense
counsel objected, arguing that the defendant's sixth amendment
right to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community, and
fourteenth amendment right to equal protection, had been violated. 4
The trial court rejected this argument and Batson was convicted.35
Relying on Swain, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed.30 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to exclude all or most blacks from the
jury established a prima facie violation of the equal protection
clause.3 7 Consequently, a new test was devised whereby the defendant need not prove the consistent and systematic exclusion of a minority group from petit juries. Instead, all that need be shown is that
the defendant is "a member of a cognizable racial group" and that
29. Id. at 203-04, 221. Members of the Court severely criticized the burden placed upon
the defense as too great.
30. 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1984).
31. Id. at 84-90 (1986). See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 82.
33. Id. at 83. The venire is the panel of jurors summoned to serve as jurors. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY

1396 (5th ed. 1979).

34. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
...
U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VI. From this language the Supreme Court has concluded that the venire must be composed of
a "fair cross section of the community." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). See
also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). But see Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803
(1990) (white defendant has standing to raise a sixth amendment challenge to the exclusion of
blacks from jury). In Holland, Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion, stating that the
right to a jury drawn "from a fair cross section of the community ... has never included the
notion that [peremptory challenges cannot be used by] both the accused and the State to
eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interests." Id. at 807. For an in-depth
analysis arguing that the sixth amendment should limit the use of peremptory challenges, see
generally, Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine.
Images and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501 (1986).
35. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
36. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83 (1986).
37. Id. at 96-97. The Court relied solely on Batson's equal protection claim, specifically
stating, "We ... express no view on the merits of petitioner's Sixth Amendment arguments."
Id. at 85 n.4.
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the prosecution has peremptorily challenged all or most of the members of the defendant's race in that case.38 When these and other
relevant factors raise an inference of discrimination, the prosecution
must then assert a racially neutral explanation for its suspect use of
peremptory challenges.8 9
Although Kern relies on the Batson rationale to restrict the de-

fendant's use of peremptory challenges, Kern is distinguishable in
several regards.4 ° First, the Court adjudicated the case solely on the
merits of the civil rights and equal protection clauses of the state
constitution. Yet the Court astutely employed the Batson reasoning
in establishing that the prosecutor had standing." The prosecution's
standing, the Court of Appeals echoed, was derived from two

sources-the rights of the wrongfully excluded jurors and the rights
of the community-at-large, whose confidence in the fairness of our
legal

system is

greatly

undermined

by judicially

reinforced

discrimination.' 2
With respect to the prosecution's equal protection claim, however, the Court relied primarily on its own assemblage of outside
authority to find the requisite state action needed to sustain such a
claim.' 3 Rejecting defense counsel's argument that Polk County v.
Dodson" stood for the proposition that "action[s] performed by a
defense attorney [can] never be attributable to the State," the Court
held that the true test is "whether the degree of involvement by the

State can be said to be substantial such that the coercive power of
the State has been enlisted to enforce private discrimination."'

5

Ap-

38. Id. at 96-97.
39. Id. at 97. Though the prosecution must provide racially neutral explanations once
the defendant has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the Court emphasized "that
the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause." Id.
40. Of course, the very fact that Kern addressed a question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Batson caused it to be an important decision. This is especially true since the
Supreme Court has given some indication of its disinclination to extend the Batson rule to the
defense. See Alabama v. Cox, 109 S. Ct. 817 (1989) (mem.).
41. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 654, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1243-44, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647,
655-56 (1990) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88).
42. Id. at 652. Accord People v. Gary, 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 1091-93, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986,
994-96 (1988) (both society and defendant are injured if peremptory challenges are executed
in discriminatory manner).
43. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 654-57, 554 N.E.2d 1243-46, 555 N.Y.S.2d 655-58. The New
York Constitution equal protection provision, like its federal counterpart, seeks to deter unlawful governmental conduct and thus requires a showing of state action.
44. 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981) (a state funded public defender's traditional lawyer
functions do not constitute state action in a criminal proceeding).
45. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 655-56, 554 N.E.2d at 1244-45, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57. The
"fair attribution" test utilized by the Court of Appeals is a two-prong test developed by the
United States Supreme Court:

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY DEFENSE

plying the facts before them, the Court specified three ways in which
the State was "inevitably and inextricably" enforcing private discrimination as a result of the defendant's use of peremptory
challenges:
[First], [a] defendant's right to exercise the challenges is conferred by State statute (citation omitted). [Second], [t]he jurors
are summoned for jury service by the State (citation omitted),
sit in a public courtroom and are subject to voir dire at the direction of the State . . . .[Third], the Judge, with the full coercive authority of the State, . . . enforces the discriminatory decision by ordering the excused juror to leave the courtroom
escorted by uniformed court officers."6

The United States Supreme Court reached an analogous result
in Shelly v. Kraemer,"7 in its response to a racially restrictive covenant. In Shelly, the Court held that judicial enforcement of the covenant constituted state action, even though the discriminatory covenant was the result of a private agreement, because "the full
coercive power of the government" had been enlisted to deny one's
property rights on the basis of race. 8
In addition, by recognizing the presence of state action when
defense counsel excludes jurors through peremptory challenges, the

Court of Appeals reinforced the parallel conclusions of the majority
of New York's lower courts. For example, in the criminal case of
People v. Davis,4 9 the court found state action notwithstanding the

question of whether defense counsel was state funded, because in
granting the racially biased peremptory challenges, "the trial judge
and other state officials . . .participate[d], facilitate[d], and acquiesce[d] in the . . .discrimination."5
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person
for whom the State is responsible . . . . Second, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
For a discussion of other tests utilized by the courts to determine whether a private party
qualifies as a state actor, see Note, supra note 9, at 359-61.
46. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 656-57, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647,
657 (1990). Peremptory challenges are granted by and stipulated in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
270.25 (Consol. 1982).
47. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
48. Id. at 19. Accord Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
49. 142 Misc. 2d 881, 537 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1988).
50. Id. at 888, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 434. See also People v. Piermont, 143 Misc.2d 839, 843,
542 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117-18 (1989); People v. Gary, 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 1089, 526 N.Y.S.2d
986, 992-94 (1988); People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 1062-63, 526 N.Y.S.2d 367, 37172 (1988). But see Holtzman v. Supreme Court, 139 Misc. 2d 109, 117-19, 526 N.Y.S.2d 892,
896-98 (1988), affid on other grounds, 152 A.D.2d 724, 545 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1989) (state action
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of Kern is the Court's primary reliance on the state constitution's civil rights clause. 1 State
constitutions, "which protect fundamental rights independently of
the United States Constitution," have increasingly been construed by
state courts "as providing greater protection to . . . citizens' individual rights than accorded under the federal constitution." 2 The
Court of Appeals continued this trend by relying on the civil rights
clause, which, unlike the federal constitution's equal protection
clause relied upon by the Batson court, "prohibits private as well as
State discrimination as to 'civil rights.' "' Jury service is a civil
right, the Court concluded, both as a "privilege of citizenship" under
the state constitution 54 and as guaranteed by the New York Civil
Rights Law, which provides:
No citizen of the state possessing all other qualifications which
are or may be required or prescribed by law, shall be disqualified to serve on a grand or petit juror in any court of this state
on account of race, creed, color, national origin or sex .... 55
Thus, although the Court bolstered its opinion by finding that
defense counsel's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges constituted state action in violation of the equal protection clause, it could
have restricted the defense solely on the basis of the civil rights
clause. Moreover, Kern's use of the civil rights clause in conjunction
with the Civil Rights Law clearly implies that cognizable groups
other than race will be recognized and that the private conduct of
plaintiff and defense counsel in civil suits will fall within the parameters of Batson. Such an extension of Batson to civil suits was flatly
rejected by the United States Court of Appeals in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 56 in which the Court was compelled to decide
does not occur when statute merely permits but does not compel defense counsel's exercise of
racially motivated peremptory challenges).
51. People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 650-53, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1241-43, 555 N.Y.2d
647, 653-55 (1990).
52. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 523-24, 511 A.2d 1150, 1157 (1986) (holding that
under the New Jersey State Constitution, the prosecution may not use peremptory challenges
to discriminate on the basis of race, color, ancestry, national origin, religious principles or sex
in the selection of jurors).
53. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (citing Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 531, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548-49 (1949)). For the precise
wording of the civil rights clause see supra note 20.
54. N.Y. CONST. art. 1,§ I ("No member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived
of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof .
55. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 13 (Consol. 1976).
56. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'g on rehearing, 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988). But see Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, reh'g denied en
banc, 873 F.2d 300 (11 th Cir. 1989) (Batson rule applies in civil cases if objecting party can
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the case within the constraints of the equal protection clause. 7

The Court of Appeals in Kern did not explicitly point to whom
the Batson restrictions should be extended. The court's primary reliance on the civil rights clause of the New York State Constitution,
however, implies a clear belief that Batson should apply to cognizable groups differentiated by factors other than race and to civil as
well as criminal trials. More importantly, because neither Batson nor
Kern abolished the peremptory challenge altogether, the defendant's
perception of an impartial jury was safeguarded while preserving two
compelling state interests - the need for balance between the prosecution and defense, and the continued confidence of the American
people in the judicial process as embodied by the jury.
G. Paige Wingert

show that the opponent has used its peremptory challenges in a racially motivated manner).
Like the federal courts, state courts have also reached opposite conclusions as to whether there
is state action in the use of peremptory challenges in civil suits. Compare Banks v. Lewis, 187
Ga. App. 218, 369 S.E.2d 537 (1988) ("Batson . . .clearly is limited in its application to
criminal proceedings") with Chavous v. Brown, 299 S.C. 398, 385 S.E.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1989)
("the principles of Batson apply to a civil case").
57. Although section 1862 of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 prohibits the
exclusion of citizens from jury service for discriminatory reasons, an examination of its legislative history reveals that section 1862 applies not to the selection of the petit jury, but only to
the selection of the venire. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1862, 1866 (1988); 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1792, 1979 ("[t]he proposed bill preserves the traditional right ... to strike [a
juror] peremptorily").

